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Abstract: :   In a Game Theory context, we  consider  partial cooperation between a portion  of the 
players and the rest of the players who do not cooperate  and play a Nash game.  The players may 
decide their strategy simultaneously or in a two-stage model.  In both cases, some properties of the 
partial cooperative equilibrium are studied and applied to a different practical situations.  
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1. Partial Cooperation   
 
We deal with an n-person  normal form  game Γ= <n; X1,..., Xn; f1,..., fn>, being  Xi  the  strategy 
space and fi the payoff (or profit) function of player Pi  defined on  X1×…×Xn  for any   i=1,...,n. If 
each  player Pi chooses  xi  in  Xi, then he obtains a profit   fi(x1,..., xn). All the players are profit 
maximizers. 
If  non-cooperative behavior is assumed between the n players, the equilibrium solution considered 
is the well known concept of Nash equilibrium, i.e.  a vector  (x1*,..., xn*) such that for any i 
 
                                           fi (x1*,..., xn*) ≤ fi (x1*,.., xi-1*, xi, xi+1*,.., xn*)                                       (1) 
 
for any xi in Xi (see, for example, Basar and Olsder, 1995).   For any i, for any x-i=(x1,.., xi-1, xi+1,.., 
xn) we define Bi(x-i )  as the  best reply correspondence or reaction of player i mapping to any x-i the 
set of the xi in Xi satisfying  (1).  If there is only one element xi satisfying (1) for all x-i, Bi(x-i )  is 
the best reply function of player i. No player has an  incentive to deviate from the profile x*=(x1*,..., 
xn*). 
From the Nash equilibrium definition, we have that  x*=(x1*,..., xn*) is a Nash equilibrium if and 
only if xi* is in  Bi(x-i *) for any i.  
On the other hand, if all the players behave cooperatively they pursue the common interest and 
would maximize the aggregate profit  
 
                                                                     f1 +…+  fn.                                                                   (2) 
 
In this case the players form a grand coalition and  they jointly  maximize the aggregate profit of the 
coalition.  
As   in several concrete situations, for example in international environmental problems, only a 
subset of the n players forms a coalition. In this case we speak about partial cooperation. This 
concept finds a natural framework in environmental problems (Section 2), but interesting 
applications can be found in Cournot oligopolistic games and public goods games (Ray and Vohra 
1997, Yi 1997, Mallozzi and Tijs 2006, 2008). 
Let us suppose that Pk+1,..., Pn, decide to cooperate. The level of non-cooperation k is given. 
Cooperating players (or signatories) choose strategies by maximizing the aggregate welfare of the 
coalition members, i.e.   
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                                                                 F=fk+1 +…+  fn.                                                                              (3) 
 
 The rest of the players (non-cooperating players or non-signatories) play as singletons and choose 
their strategies as a Nash equilibrium with payoffs f1,…, fk. 
 In this case we define the  partial cooperative equilibrium  (Mallozzi and Tijs 2006, 2008). There 
are mainly two assumptions regarding the sequence of moves in the above scheme.  
 
 
 
 Nash-Cournot assumption  
 
All the players choose simultaneously their strategies   (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1992);  the partial 
cooperative equilibrium is a strategy profile x*= (x1*,.., xk*, xk+1*,.., xn*) that is a Nash 
equilibrium of the k+1 person game with strategy spaces X1,..., Xk, Xk+1×...×Xn and payoffs 
f1,…,fn, F where F is given in (3). In this case the player k+1 is the group of signatory persons, 
whose strategy is a vector y=(xk+1,.., xn). A strategy profile  x*=(x1*,..., xk*,y*) is a Nash 
equilibrium if and only if xi* is in  Bi(x-i *) for any i=1,…,k and  y* is in player k+1’s best reply 
Bk+1(x1*,..., xk*), that is the set of  y*=(xk+1*,.., xn*) satisfying F (x1*,..., xn*) ≤ F (x1*,.., xk*, xk+1,.., 
xn) for any (xk+1,.., xn).  Sometimes Bk+1(x1*,..., xk*)  is called group best reply correspondence.                           
 
 
 
 
                          Figure 1: Signatories and non-signatories simultaneous decision 
 
 Stackelberg assumption 
 
Signatories and non-signatories choose their strategies  sequentially (Barret, 1994);  the partial 
cooperative equilibrium is a strategy profile x*= (x1*,.., xk*, xk+1*,.., xn*) where (xk+1*,.., xn*) is a 
Stackelberg leader strategy of the leading coalition, given (x1*,.., xk*)  the Nash equilibrium of the k 
person game –followers- with payoffs  f1,…,fk. More precisely, to any possible signatories decision 
y=(xk+1,.., xn), non-signatories react with a Nash equilibrium profile (x1,.., xk). Suppose that this 
reaction is unique for any y, say (x1(y),.., xk(y)), the signatories maximize their joint profit F given in 
(3)  given the non-signatories reaction, i.e. they solve the problem  
 
                                                              Max  F(x1(y),.., xk(y),y)                                                                    (4) 
                                                                                                   y 
In this model  the Stackelberg leadership of the signatories has been assumed (Mallozzi and Tijs, 
2008):  signatories announce their joint strategy,   non-signatories - the followers -  act as singletons 
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 and react by playing a non-cooperative  game.  The equilibrium x*  is determined by using a 
backward induction procedure.  
It is possible that for a certain y that  the non-signatories may react with several admissible  profiles 
(x1,.., xk) that are Nash equilibria. In this case, it is possible  to define the partial cooperative 
equilibrium by using a selection in the set of the non-signatories reactions (Mallozzi and Tijs, 2008) 
and defining a suitable optimization problem for signatories, that corresponds to  the problem (4) in 
the uniqueness case.   
 
 
                            Figure 2: Signatories and non-signatories two-stage decision 
 
In both assumptions 1.1 and 1.2, let us remark that for k=n all the players act as singletons and 
solve a Nash equilibrium problem and for k=0 all the players jointly maximize the sum of the 
profits given in (2). In the first case the definition of partial cooperative equilibrium coincides with 
the definition of Nash equilibrium, in the second case with the definition of  social optimum (Finus 
2001).   
 
Suppose now that a partial cooperative equilibrium x* is given. An interesting question is to 
compare the outputs in the two mentioned assumptions. 
 Let us call by VNC  =  fk+1(x*) +…+  fn(x*)   the signatories’ aggregate profit under the Nash-
Cournot assumption and by VS the analogous under the Stackelberg  one, assuming the uniqueness 
of the non-signatories reaction.  
 
Proposition 1. We have that 
 
                                                                     VNC ≤ VS                                                                                                       (5) 
 
This means that from the signatories point of view, it is better to be in the leading coalition group.  
Analogous results can be given also without the uniqueness assumption of the non-signatories 
reaction.  In Finus 2001 the inequality (5) is proved by direct calculation in the special case of 
identical  (symmetric players) quadratic profit functions.   
 
 
2. International Environmental Agreements (IEA) 
 
In the last decades several papers on the economics of international environmental problems have 
been devoted to coalition analysis in a Game Theory context, particularly to coalition formation 
processes. See Yi (1997), Ray and Vohra (1997), Finus (2001) and the references therein. Recall for 
instance the Helsinki and Oslo Protocols on the reduction of sulphur signed in 1985 and 1994, and 
the Kyoto Protocol on the reduction of greenhouse gases  causing global warming signed in 1997.  
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 Since environmental problem are not of local nature, global welfare can be raised through 
cooperation. The usual situation in these problem is that only a portion of the countries involved 
sign an agreement, so the partial cooperative equilibrium concept represents a useful tool (Finus, 
2001).  
In the context of the formation of IEA the models consider three-stage games. In the first stage 
(coalition formation game) players decide whether participate in an agreement through binary 
variables: different coalitions may appear and a strategy of a player specifies to join or not join a 
specific coalition.  In the second stage (partial cooperative game) players choose their emission 
levels: signatories choose within their coalition the group emissions and non-signatories act non-
cooperatively. In the third stage (cooperative game), assuming asymmetric countries, the allocation 
of the welfare gains among the coalition members  is decided according a sharing rule, for example 
the Nash bargaining solution or the Shapley value.  In Section 1 a unique coalition between players 
has been considered and only the second stage or the partial cooperative game has been discussed in 
a general framework. 
Let us consider n countries, i=1,…,n, and the welfare or profit πi of the i-th country     
 
                                                               πi = βi (ei)-  φi (Σi ei)                                                         (6) 
 
where the i-th  country benefits from his own emission ei  receiving βi (ei) and suffers damage φi (Σi 
ei) from its own ei and foreign ej, j ≠ i emissions. By choosing  in formula (6) the following  
functions  β(t) and φ (t) for any i (symmetric countries) 
 
βi (t)= β(t)=at-bt²   
  φi (t)= φ (t)= ct²-dt 
 
 the partial cooperative equilibrium is given explicitly together with the aggregate emissions 
expressions, so comparison in the two above assumptions is straightforward (Finus 2001).  
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